A regime that feeds on itself to survive
by Vlad Vexler
Putin's Transport Minister, Roman Starovoit, appears to have taken his own life under opaque circumstances.
Let’s look at what this tells us about the internal dynamics of a regime that increasingly feeds on itself to survive.
I. The Kursk incursion
Roughly 700 days into Putin’s 3-day “special operation”, Ukrainian forces carried out an incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin - monarch of a borderless empire - didn’t panic, but he was embarrassed. The failure was linked to corruption, with vast sums allegedly stolen during the construction of fortifications. The latest figure to take the blame appears to be Roman Starovoit - Transport Minister of Russia, and formerly Governor of Kursk (2018-2024).
II. Regime Stability
Putin’s regime appears stable. But in war, stability becomes autoimmune. The regime has to feed on itself to survive. The regime is built on corruption, but war forces the regime to attack itself with theatrical rituals of accountability and anti-corruption gestures. Even loyal public servants can be sacrificed to defend the regime from the Prigozhinite critique that is it simply incompetent (don't forget, Prigozhin's spirit is still politically alive).
III. Info Fog
The Putin regime is veiling the event in informational fog. Was the minister found at home? In his car? Near his car? Was he dismissed by Putin before or after his death? We discussed this need to destabilise citizens' sense of what's knowable in our propaganda video last year.
IV Tussle Behind The Scenes
Putin's regime is made of of clans whose contestation Putin referees. In my analysis, one of the reasons for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is that Putin felt his refereeing powers had weakened. He was outsourcing presidential powers - informally and unconstitutionally - but losing the capacity to arbitrate the conflicts that ensued.
How does this apply to the Starovoit case?
How does this apply to the Starovoit case?
Starovoit had recently appeared on a video call with Putin, looking composed and in favour. His sudden demise may suggest a behind-the-scenes struggle over who should fall for the Kursk failure. The question may have been: who, and how visibly?
V Don’t Dig Too Deep
Within the regime, blame can be distributed only so far. The system disciplines itself without implicating the very top. The regime is putting Ministry of Defence officials on trial – but not Shoigu.
Starovoit was aligned with the Rotenberg camp in the regime. It is possible the Rotenberg camp tried to shield him, and failed. But tellingly, Starovoit’s replacement also comes from the Rotenberg camp.
VI Echoes of 1937
In earlier purges – like the 2016 arrest of Minister Ulyukaev – a senior official might receive a seven-year sentence, followed by a quiet exit from public life. This model is shifting. Today’s scapegoats may face not 7 years but 17. It’s plausible that Starovoit’s death was a response to this changed expectation.
The regime’s repressive machinery is widening and deepening. My analysis suggests that a future phase may involve the direct physical elimination of regime insiders, not as an exception but as the rule.
The regime’s repressive machinery is widening and deepening. My analysis suggests that a future phase may involve the direct physical elimination of regime insiders, not as an exception but as the rule.
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