The United States has, for the first time, authorized Ukraine to use American long-range missiles to defend its troops in the Russian region of Kursk, occupied by forces that, since last August, have placed Moscow’s military apparatus under psychological and tactical pressure.
Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, responded by stating that this would mean war with NATO, while Vladimir Dzhabarov, a deputy in the Duma, declared that it was “a very important step toward World War III.”
In Europe, there is unease, with preparations for war scenarios alternating with cowardly calls for peace.
For two years, the Kremlin has been threatening nuclear apocalypse, a threat it did not make so frequently back when it was a genuine power, which demonstrates that Moscow feels fragile and weak. Should we then be worried? I might be wrong, of course, but I would say no.
This escalation seems psychological to me and part of the game aimed at resolving the Ukrainian conflict, which, let us always remember, was triggered by the Russian invasion at a time of significant de-escalation in the Donbas, and when the two main European nations were led by openly pro-Russian governments.
This occurred just after an agreement between Europe and Kyiv on the use of rare minerals (aka "critical raw materials") from the Donbas for our civilian and military industries, which alarmed the Americans.
Russia, whatever its “subjective” reasons, chose, by invading Ukraine, for the third consecutive time (after Libya and the Sahel), to attack our interests and favor those of the United States.
Since then, a Yalta 2.0 scenario has been proposed, albeit a second-rate version (limited to the European containment quadrant): with similar mechanisms to those of the past, the aim is to keep Europe under pressure and likely to divide Ukraine.
Trump’s election, with his promise to end the war, now requires repositioning.
But how will it end? Immediately after his election, he made it clear that he could not force Kyiv to make concessions if Moscow did not do the same. Yet, after more than two years of a bloody conflict that has benefited only the U.S., how can one accept leaving behind part of the captured territory, especially after the mistake of officially “annexing” it?
Moscow must hope for a Ukrainian military collapse by the summer, as several logistical indicators make it fear its own collapse within a year.
The U.S. wants a divided Ukraine and a threatening Russia because the latter has always been its watchdog against Europe. However, they also need to save face by avoiding a decisive Russian military victory, which would be the second-worst scenario for Washington.
The first would be a new implosion of Moscow, as happened in 1991, which plunged the Americans into a cold sweat and forced them to devise complex strategies worldwide to fill the resulting vacuum.
To push the parties toward negotiations, what better than the “eve of nuclear war,” as during the Cuban Missile Crisis 62 years ago? Hence the mutual ballistic threats.
If this leads to negotiations, the question remains: what will the Russians concede, and, above all, who will do it on their behalf?
Putin cannot concede anything because it would spell his doom.
This is why, considering that at the top of the Russian hierarchy, there has been constant infighting since the start of the war, it is likely that Moscow may begin contemplating eliminating the great mediator of domestic mafias who, for 25 years, has controlled power despite very different governments and directions.
Even the godfathers sometimes face risks. If I were him, I wouldn’t rest easy.
Let me be clear: I am not wishing for Putin to be killed; I am merely considering what could be the great formal solution for the “peaceful” consolidation of a Yalta 2.0.
A solution that, if it happens, will be entirely Russian and follow the usual methods over there.
In any case, whether Putin stays or not, it makes absolutely no difference to us: this is not a wish but a rational conjecture.
In any event, we will remain trapped in a pincer between East and West.
Also published at No Reporter
This escalation seems psychological to me and part of the game aimed at resolving the Ukrainian conflict, which, let us always remember, was triggered by the Russian invasion at a time of significant de-escalation in the Donbas, and when the two main European nations were led by openly pro-Russian governments.
This occurred just after an agreement between Europe and Kyiv on the use of rare minerals (aka "critical raw materials") from the Donbas for our civilian and military industries, which alarmed the Americans.
Russia, whatever its “subjective” reasons, chose, by invading Ukraine, for the third consecutive time (after Libya and the Sahel), to attack our interests and favor those of the United States.
Since then, a Yalta 2.0 scenario has been proposed, albeit a second-rate version (limited to the European containment quadrant): with similar mechanisms to those of the past, the aim is to keep Europe under pressure and likely to divide Ukraine.
Trump’s election, with his promise to end the war, now requires repositioning.
But how will it end? Immediately after his election, he made it clear that he could not force Kyiv to make concessions if Moscow did not do the same. Yet, after more than two years of a bloody conflict that has benefited only the U.S., how can one accept leaving behind part of the captured territory, especially after the mistake of officially “annexing” it?
Moscow must hope for a Ukrainian military collapse by the summer, as several logistical indicators make it fear its own collapse within a year.
The U.S. wants a divided Ukraine and a threatening Russia because the latter has always been its watchdog against Europe. However, they also need to save face by avoiding a decisive Russian military victory, which would be the second-worst scenario for Washington.
The first would be a new implosion of Moscow, as happened in 1991, which plunged the Americans into a cold sweat and forced them to devise complex strategies worldwide to fill the resulting vacuum.
To push the parties toward negotiations, what better than the “eve of nuclear war,” as during the Cuban Missile Crisis 62 years ago? Hence the mutual ballistic threats.
If this leads to negotiations, the question remains: what will the Russians concede, and, above all, who will do it on their behalf?
Putin cannot concede anything because it would spell his doom.
This is why, considering that at the top of the Russian hierarchy, there has been constant infighting since the start of the war, it is likely that Moscow may begin contemplating eliminating the great mediator of domestic mafias who, for 25 years, has controlled power despite very different governments and directions.
Even the godfathers sometimes face risks. If I were him, I wouldn’t rest easy.
Let me be clear: I am not wishing for Putin to be killed; I am merely considering what could be the great formal solution for the “peaceful” consolidation of a Yalta 2.0.
A solution that, if it happens, will be entirely Russian and follow the usual methods over there.
In any case, whether Putin stays or not, it makes absolutely no difference to us: this is not a wish but a rational conjecture.
In any event, we will remain trapped in a pincer between East and West.
Also published at No Reporter
"The U.S. wants a divided Ukraine and a threatening Russia because the latter has always been its watchdog against Europe."
ReplyDeleteHow does that even make sense?? America wants to focus on the pacific and China, not on Europe. A threatening Russia complicates these plans. The US wants a divided Europe : tariffs and commercial warfare being enough of a watchdod against the old contient's ambition as a global power. Having to keep troops in Europe because Russia's got a bad case of ED isn't exactly playing in favour of Washington. But that's just the way I see it, perhaps I'm wrong...
Never been a fan of Adinolfi and his marxist tendencies.
You'd have to inhale a lot of galaxy gas to believe this sentence makes any amount of sense.
DeleteThank you for sharing my article
ReplyDeleteGabriele Adinolfi