I've seen a lot of girly butthurt in "British nationalist" circles recently about the UK's decision to give up a tiny piece of territory it still holds in the Indian Ocean. The girly butthurt is also incredibly ill-informed on basic geopolitical and diplomatic stuff.
On a girly butthurt feelz level, there is not much to separate me from other "British Empire nostalgists." It's nice to have little spots of territory dotted around the world that belong to the "Mother Country."
I was in Hong Kong for a few days when it was still under the Union Jack, but to be honest, it didn't feel any less Chinese than it does today. Britain's control in the years before the handover was only nominal, and being a Brit didn't give you any special privileges. Already the Chinese seemed to be in charge. 1997 merely marked the handover from local Chinese control to Beijing control, that's all.
I was in Hong Kong for a few days when it was still under the Union Jack, but to be honest, it didn't feel any less Chinese than it does today. Britain's control in the years before the handover was only nominal, and being a Brit didn't give you any special privileges. Already the Chinese seemed to be in charge. 1997 merely marked the handover from local Chinese control to Beijing control, that's all.
With the Chagos islands and the "British" Indian Ocean Territory, it's something similar. There is nothing at all colonial or "British" about that territory.
Since decolonisation kicked into high gear in the 1960s, UK governments of whichever stripe made the decision to reduce "overseas commitments" as much as possible. There is a very good technical reason for that, which can simply be called "not letting the door hit your butt on the way out."
European nations unwilling to decolonize have often been the victim of this, the French especially, but also the Dutch, and the Portuguese. The French tried to hang on in Vietnam and Algeria. They have also tried, more recently, to hang on in a "Neo-colonial" sense in parts of the Sahara. All these efforts have seen the French humiliated in one form or another.
The door hitting the French squarely on the butt
The Dutch were also reluctant to leave Indonesia post-WWII, and were therefore pointed in the general direction of Amsterdam by the boots of the natives. The Portuguese too got a drubbing in East Timor, Goa, and Africa from the Indonesians, Indians, and Cubans for trying to hang on too long.
The problem is small territories (or not so small territories) half-way around the world are no longer cheap or easy to defend, especially for weak, unwarlike Western nations, full of soft youths, universal principles, and dubious fifth columns operated by geopolitical rivals.
The nature of European colonial empires in essence was "easy expansion at distance against temporarily weak opponents" over "difficult expansion at home against strong opponents." The latter of these two strategies was behind so many of the bloody and fruitless wars in European history. Britain's success as "the largest empire ever" was the implementation of the former strategy to the fullest, something that was made possible by its temporary naval dominance. But this success was ultimately curtailed by the temporary nature of the factors on which it depended.
The only reason the UK is still in the Chagos Islands in the present day is because it holds it as a "front man" for the USA, which believes it is an excellent spot for one of their strategic naval bases.
It has to be emphasised that the UK's so-called "special relationship" with the USA is totally useless when it comes to protecting the remnants of the UK's colonial past in the absence of an additional US motive. The same is largely true of the US's other "special relationships" with other countries.
Back in the 1950s, the US only intervened in French Indochina on the understanding that the French would give up their colonies there; and when fellow-NATO partner Portugal was attacked by Soviet and Cuban-backed forces in Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s, the US of course stayed out of it.
We see the exact same story with the Argentine attack on the British Falkland Islands in 1982, where a permanent member of the UN Security Council almost got humiliated by a third-rate nation with a few French Exocets. The US, as usual, stood by and let it all happen, while continuing to use numerous British bases around the world for its own geopolitical projection.
Back in the 1950s, the US only intervened in French Indochina on the understanding that the French would give up their colonies there; and when fellow-NATO partner Portugal was attacked by Soviet and Cuban-backed forces in Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s, the US of course stayed out of it.
We see the exact same story with the Argentine attack on the British Falkland Islands in 1982, where a permanent member of the UN Security Council almost got humiliated by a third-rate nation with a few French Exocets. The US, as usual, stood by and let it all happen, while continuing to use numerous British bases around the world for its own geopolitical projection.
The simple facts sound bad, but the US had to think about its "soft power" position.
After WWII, the world was facing two combined surges of revolution, one "right-wing" in nature, the other "left-wing." The first was the Wilsonian "self-determination" revolution kicked off by WWI that had now, thanks to the weakening of the main colonial nations by WWII, reached the non-European World. Combined with this, there was the left-wing challenge of Communism.
After WWII, the world was facing two combined surges of revolution, one "right-wing" in nature, the other "left-wing." The first was the Wilsonian "self-determination" revolution kicked off by WWI that had now, thanks to the weakening of the main colonial nations by WWII, reached the non-European World. Combined with this, there was the left-wing challenge of Communism.
To stop these potent forces from combining against it, the US had to take a generally anti-colonial stance, emphasise local self-determination, and trust to its economic power and the benefits of a free-trade global system to offer an alternative to the grubby delights of Third World Communism. The results of the Cold War suggest that it largely worked. But now there are additional challenges.
Today Britain has been fully subsumed into this American post-colonial paradigm that emphasises "moral" or "soft" power within an internationally agreed, all-inclusive "rules-based system." It is hoped that this will be enough to contain the rising "large authoritarian" powers, which include China, Russia, and possibly India and Japan in the future.
The idea that Britain can set up on its own and ignore all this tedious diplomatic context and "security infrastructure," and promote its interests in a more hard-edged or autarkic way may be emotionally satisfying, but it is hardly realistic.
Hypothetically and as a bit of a LARP this might sound good on a low-IQ livestream for a few minutes. Yes, let's imagine recreating a mini "Neo-Britsh Empire" of remote outposts, including Pitcairn, Chagos, and our string of tiny isolated Atlantic islands (St Helena, Ascencion, etc.) all the way down to the Falkland Island, South Georgia, and the British Antarctic territory.
But in actuality this would require some sort of weird state with authoritarian, "fascist," or "Zionist" characteristics that would be prepared to threaten larger countries with nuclear weapons if they impinged on our far-flung outposts. Probably not very workable beyond the LARPing.
Created an Empire, forgot to evolve an ideology to go with it
But in actuality this would require some sort of weird state with authoritarian, "fascist," or "Zionist" characteristics that would be prepared to threaten larger countries with nuclear weapons if they impinged on our far-flung outposts. Probably not very workable beyond the LARPing.
As for the present tawdry deal over the British Indian Ocean Territories, a deal that was the work of previous Tory administrations and the British Deep State, it preserves Britain's soft power, for what that's worth, while also ensuring that the islands will continue to be used for American hard power purposes for the next hundred years.
It is not impossible that a future Britain may once again require resources and living space abroad, but any such scheme will have to be thought out, coldly and logically, according to the most rigorous principles of geopolitics, and not as some emotional reaction to the changed diplomatic status of a US naval base thousands of miles from the UK.
____________________
Colin Liddell is the Chief Editor of Neokrat and the author of Interviews & Obituaries, a collection of encounters with the dead and the famous. As there is absolutely zero reward for writing honest content like this, support his work by buying his book here (USA), here (UK), and here (Australia). or by taking out a paid subscription on his Substack.
No comments:
Post a Comment
All Comments MUST include a name (either real or sock). Also don't give us an easy excuse to ignore your brilliant comment by using "shitposty" language.