At first, it just seemed to be Russia, but now, thanks to Trump's gaff in the Gulf, there is a clear pattern to what we have seen on the global stage in the last few years that has a much wider significance.
It is this: would-be unipolar powers suck at unipolarity (and may even suck at multipolarity!).
Both the terrorist invasion of the Ukraine in 2022 and the equally terrorist attempt by America to destroy the Islamic Republic of Iran from the sky in 2026 were both "unipolar moves," that is, they were attempts by powers that saw themselves as "superior to the riff raff" of the international community and, indeed, as unique global hegemons, to impose their "Olympian" will.
American arrogance is well known and would seem to have had some basis in objective fact until relatively recently, but less well known is that Russia also saw itself as the "one true hegemon." This was because the Kremlin viewed its American rival as an essentially leaderless "open system" that it could hack and dominate at will, while reassuring itself that China was too passive and predictable to compete. (The Zionist Israeli state views itself in very similar terms to the Kremlin).
But what we have seen in the last few years—and now the last few days—are the limitations of these unipolar pretensions.
I won't bore you with all the tedious military details and oil price data, but Trump is set to be remembered mainly as the agent of chaos that revealed the hollowness of America's "Potemkin village" of hegemonic superiority, an illusion that had carefully been built up by former Presidents (who were good listeners); while Putin will go down in history as the exemplar of Russia's imploded insane conceit.
It is this: would-be unipolar powers suck at unipolarity (and may even suck at multipolarity!).
Both the terrorist invasion of the Ukraine in 2022 and the equally terrorist attempt by America to destroy the Islamic Republic of Iran from the sky in 2026 were both "unipolar moves," that is, they were attempts by powers that saw themselves as "superior to the riff raff" of the international community and, indeed, as unique global hegemons, to impose their "Olympian" will.
American arrogance is well known and would seem to have had some basis in objective fact until relatively recently, but less well known is that Russia also saw itself as the "one true hegemon." This was because the Kremlin viewed its American rival as an essentially leaderless "open system" that it could hack and dominate at will, while reassuring itself that China was too passive and predictable to compete. (The Zionist Israeli state views itself in very similar terms to the Kremlin).
But what we have seen in the last few years—and now the last few days—are the limitations of these unipolar pretensions.
I won't bore you with all the tedious military details and oil price data, but Trump is set to be remembered mainly as the agent of chaos that revealed the hollowness of America's "Potemkin village" of hegemonic superiority, an illusion that had carefully been built up by former Presidents (who were good listeners); while Putin will go down in history as the exemplar of Russia's imploded insane conceit.
This should not be too surprising as neither Russia or America ever fully paid their geopolitical dues on their way to top. Indeed, both went from "geopolitical zeroes" to "geopolitical heroes" overnight.
Russia was a desolate wasteland only able to impact neighbouring desolate wastelands until around about 1812, when somebody of importance decided to stick his neck into their particular desolate wasteland; while America was a geopolitical non-entity protected behind a wall of British sea power until relatively recently (c. 1900).
Both of these unipolar pretenders got their big break in 1945, when all the old great powers lay in relative ruin after WWII. Yes, their ascendency was negative, based on the mutual exhaustion of others, rather than positive, i.e. based on their own merits.
In a sense, their prominence has always been fake, and this is exactly what the current conflicts—both "three day military operations" that went wrong (LOL)—are now showing.
Russia has already destroyed itself in Ukraine and is doomed to collapse even if Ukraine insanely decided to surrender, which it definitely won't do.
America won't destroy itself in Iran, but is well on its way to annihilating its illusion of global hegemonic power that it managed to maintain for decades while running away, like a hysterical schoolgirl, from any minor conflict where a few dozen yanks got slotted or the price of gas went up a bit.
America's failure to achieve compactness and a well-run public transport system
has led to a pathetic oversensitivity to the price of gas that is its Achilles Heel.
Right now, America's options are to lose this war with Iran gracefully by throwing Trump and Israel under the bus, and then seeking to re-erect some shards of its Potemkin village of "global power"; or else to double down on failure and put "boots on the ground" until its pathetically low pain threshold sees it run away again in the full glare of global attention, leading to America forever being seen as a geopolitical joke by everyone, even in the low-info section of humanity.
With both Russia and America failing so badly in their unipolar pretentions, it is clear that we are heading for a much more multipolar world order/disorder. Indeed, under the illusions of unipolarity, the world was always and has always been much a more multipolar thing than it seemed. "Big America" could only be big as long as it was backed up by its less gullible allies.
With the fading of the unipolar frame, a more interesting question to ask at this point is, "Will America be immunised by its failure in this war against its tendency to be manipulated by Israel into wars and adventures far beyond its borders?" Will it even "do geopolitics" 10 or 20 years from now? The peculiar attributes of America, isolated from the greater world by two vast oceans, means that it really has no need to do so.
The failure of both Putin and Trump's incompetent unipolar adventurism of the 2020s will help usher in a consciously multipolar world above the substrate of a world that has always remained multipolar. But there is also a strong possibility that a collapsed Russia and a deeply chastened and inward-looking America will have a less than average role to play in it.
In fact, we could see them both go from "geopolitical heroes" back to the "geopolitical zeroes" they started out as, without any intervening stage of multipolarity. After all, multipolarity is a game that is better played by those urbane and sophisticated nations with long histories, who have always seen global politics as a complex multi-player game, rather than some amusement for giant overgrown toddlers.
The failure of both Putin and Trump's incompetent unipolar adventurism of the 2020s will help usher in a consciously multipolar world above the substrate of a world that has always remained multipolar. But there is also a strong possibility that a collapsed Russia and a deeply chastened and inward-looking America will have a less than average role to play in it.
In fact, we could see them both go from "geopolitical heroes" back to the "geopolitical zeroes" they started out as, without any intervening stage of multipolarity. After all, multipolarity is a game that is better played by those urbane and sophisticated nations with long histories, who have always seen global politics as a complex multi-player game, rather than some amusement for giant overgrown toddlers.
___________________________________
Colin Liddell is the Chief Editor of Neokrat and the author of Interviews & Obituaries, a collection of encounters with the dead and the famous. Support his work by buying his book here (USA), here (UK), and here (Australia), or by taking out a paid subscription on his Substack.
No comments:
Post a Comment
All Comments MUST include a name (either real or sock). Also don't give us an easy excuse to ignore your brilliant comment by using "shitposty" language.