Wars are not won and empires are not forged by asymmetrical battles between First World special forces and sleepy and corrupt Third World guards, so, if you are chest-thumping over Trump's "coup" in kidnapping Nicolas Maduro, then you may well be a moron or at least moron-adjacent.
Is there anything more substantial to this Trump "Neo-Imperialist" thing that seems to be underway? Is there an actual "Trump Doctrine" and, if so, what is it and is it at all workable?
Let's assume that there is such a thing as a Trump Doctrine and that we can fill in the blanks from (a) the recently published National Security Strategy document, (b) the actions of Trump and the "justifications" he gives, and (c) what we know about Trump more generally. After that, we have to consider how this doctrine aligns with what we know about America and Americans to decide whether it has any long-term prospects, like, say, the Monroe Doctrine.
If we just look at the recently published National Security Strategy document, then the Trump Doctrine is totally amoral or even immoral in that it places dictatorships on an equal or superior footing to fellow democracies (America is still a democracy until Trump rounds up his political opponents and has them shot). In particular, the National Security Strategy denounces attempts to apply Western morality on other countries:
The National Security Strategy also implies a multipolar world, with the big strong countries, among whom Trump erroneously includes the "Second World" state of Russia, each having its own sphere of influence:
But this respect for the "backyards" of other big powers is counteracted by the actions of Trump and his administration which continues to dabble in places like the Ukraine, Syria, and the First Island Chain off the coast of China.
Trump's apparent respect for multipolarity and his tolerance for "diverse" political systems is patchy at best and is always overridden by the prospect of cutting a deal that can benefit America (or more precisely American businessmen with "favourable" ties to the Trump administration).
Next, the Trump Doctrine clearly believes in using military action without any of the moral or humanitarian guard rails that former administrations at least made some attempt to adhere to. However, there is still a need to provide a tenuous moral justification for bombing and killing people, as we see in the case of Venezuela, where the action was morally predicated on the fact that some drugs from Venezuela were reaching America and that some formerly US-owned assets in the country were nationalised around 20 years ago.
Needless to say, this kind of moral justification for violence in no way limits its application. Based on this casus belli, America could theoretically invade Mexico tomorrow and Canada the day after that, as America's massive appetite for narcotics (it is the true narcostate) draws in harmful substances from every corner of the globe. Likewise with national restrictions on American capitalism. The nationalisation of US oil assets in Venezuela is no more a cause of war than the EU's decision to recently fine a prominent US businessman 120 million euros.
So, the Trump Doctrine is effectively just the right of an aggressively assertive and militarily dominant US state to attack any other state that is deemed at variance with the gross financial interests of America and its leadership.
But the real test of a doctrine is whether it is realistic beyond one or two special cases. Attacking someone as incompetent and unpopular as Maduro was an extremely low bar. The Monroe Doctrine is well established because it was a reasonable doctrine that enjoyed significant outside support, most notably from the entire American public, the British Navy, which effectively enforced it for most of its history, and other New World states.
The Trump Doctrine, however, seems to have a much narrower base of support, namely the clique around the President and boomertard patriots who use the transitory achievements of the American military as a substitute for the inactive nature of their genitalia.
Also, it is clear that another hard limit on the Trump Doctrine is America's inability to suffer casualties. This is usually the killer for any American President trying to establish a new doctrine. I mean, no one remembers the "Reagan doctrine" of stabilising the Middle East or the "Bush and Clinton doctrine" of helping out messed up African states, both of which collapsed at first contact with the Grim Reaper in Beirut and Mogadishu.
Even the Trump Doctrine's successful visit to Maduro's presidential hidey-hole was treading on geopolitical eggshells and essentially riding its luck. One crashed copter or Maduro escaping would have cast quite a different light on this operation, pushing it towards the aborted "doctrines" that lay behind the Bay of Pigs and President Carter's failed attempt to rescue the US hostages in Iran.
By my estimate, almost any US Presidential doctrine that doesn't have widespread international support can be killed by the loss of between 29 and 265 US servicemen (the numbers killed in Mogadishu and Beirut).
Of course, due to the cultural and moral degradation of the American people in the period since the 1990s, this figure may have been pushed a little higher, especially when using contracted mercenaries, but the number is still relatively low and will ensure that the Trump Doctrine, such as it is, will have a very limited lifespan.
Is there anything more substantial to this Trump "Neo-Imperialist" thing that seems to be underway? Is there an actual "Trump Doctrine" and, if so, what is it and is it at all workable?
Let's assume that there is such a thing as a Trump Doctrine and that we can fill in the blanks from (a) the recently published National Security Strategy document, (b) the actions of Trump and the "justifications" he gives, and (c) what we know about Trump more generally. After that, we have to consider how this doctrine aligns with what we know about America and Americans to decide whether it has any long-term prospects, like, say, the Monroe Doctrine.
If we just look at the recently published National Security Strategy document, then the Trump Doctrine is totally amoral or even immoral in that it places dictatorships on an equal or superior footing to fellow democracies (America is still a democracy until Trump rounds up his political opponents and has them shot). In particular, the National Security Strategy denounces attempts to apply Western morality on other countries:
"We seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories."
The National Security Strategy also implies a multipolar world, with the big strong countries, among whom Trump erroneously includes the "Second World" state of Russia, each having its own sphere of influence:
"This does not mean wasting blood and treasure to curtail the influence of all the world’s great and middle powers. The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations."
But this respect for the "backyards" of other big powers is counteracted by the actions of Trump and his administration which continues to dabble in places like the Ukraine, Syria, and the First Island Chain off the coast of China.
Trump's apparent respect for multipolarity and his tolerance for "diverse" political systems is patchy at best and is always overridden by the prospect of cutting a deal that can benefit America (or more precisely American businessmen with "favourable" ties to the Trump administration).
Next, the Trump Doctrine clearly believes in using military action without any of the moral or humanitarian guard rails that former administrations at least made some attempt to adhere to. However, there is still a need to provide a tenuous moral justification for bombing and killing people, as we see in the case of Venezuela, where the action was morally predicated on the fact that some drugs from Venezuela were reaching America and that some formerly US-owned assets in the country were nationalised around 20 years ago.
Needless to say, this kind of moral justification for violence in no way limits its application. Based on this casus belli, America could theoretically invade Mexico tomorrow and Canada the day after that, as America's massive appetite for narcotics (it is the true narcostate) draws in harmful substances from every corner of the globe. Likewise with national restrictions on American capitalism. The nationalisation of US oil assets in Venezuela is no more a cause of war than the EU's decision to recently fine a prominent US businessman 120 million euros.
So, the Trump Doctrine is effectively just the right of an aggressively assertive and militarily dominant US state to attack any other state that is deemed at variance with the gross financial interests of America and its leadership.
But the real test of a doctrine is whether it is realistic beyond one or two special cases. Attacking someone as incompetent and unpopular as Maduro was an extremely low bar. The Monroe Doctrine is well established because it was a reasonable doctrine that enjoyed significant outside support, most notably from the entire American public, the British Navy, which effectively enforced it for most of its history, and other New World states.
The "Monroe" Doctrine
The Trump Doctrine, however, seems to have a much narrower base of support, namely the clique around the President and boomertard patriots who use the transitory achievements of the American military as a substitute for the inactive nature of their genitalia.
Also, it is clear that another hard limit on the Trump Doctrine is America's inability to suffer casualties. This is usually the killer for any American President trying to establish a new doctrine. I mean, no one remembers the "Reagan doctrine" of stabilising the Middle East or the "Bush and Clinton doctrine" of helping out messed up African states, both of which collapsed at first contact with the Grim Reaper in Beirut and Mogadishu.
Even the Trump Doctrine's successful visit to Maduro's presidential hidey-hole was treading on geopolitical eggshells and essentially riding its luck. One crashed copter or Maduro escaping would have cast quite a different light on this operation, pushing it towards the aborted "doctrines" that lay behind the Bay of Pigs and President Carter's failed attempt to rescue the US hostages in Iran.
By my estimate, almost any US Presidential doctrine that doesn't have widespread international support can be killed by the loss of between 29 and 265 US servicemen (the numbers killed in Mogadishu and Beirut).
Of course, due to the cultural and moral degradation of the American people in the period since the 1990s, this figure may have been pushed a little higher, especially when using contracted mercenaries, but the number is still relatively low and will ensure that the Trump Doctrine, such as it is, will have a very limited lifespan.
___________________________________
Colin Liddell is the Chief Editor of Neokrat and the author of Interviews & Obituaries, a collection of encounters with the dead and the famous. Support his work by buying his book here (USA), here (UK), and here (Australia), or by taking out a paid subscription on his Substack.
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