The snake shedding its skin
by Cemil Kerimoglu
Western historians and analysts have always failed to comprehend Russia. Among many other things, its imperial nature has been puzzling to Westerners. For obvious reasons, there has been a tendency to compare it to Western colonial empires. As a prominent historian of Russia - Richard Pipes, once noted unlike Western colonial empires which first became nation-states before embarking on imperial expansion, Russia was an empire from its inception.
This lack of understanding arises from our persistent adherence to a linear view of history and the assumption of a unified humanity progressing along a single path. However, such perspectives are fundamentally flawed. To truly grasp historical processes - particularly when it comes to understanding Russia - we must adopt a cyclical and modular view of history, as articulated by Oswald Spengler. This approach recognizes that different cultural/civilizational realms operate according to their own unique rhythms and internal logics. By embracing this perspective, we can gain deeper insights into Russia's historical trajectory and, crucially, make more accurate predictions about its future.
The current unfolding of world events, particularly Russia's invasion of Ukraine and more generally its stance in the global arena, present a fascinating test case for historical and cultural analysis. In this context, the theories of Oswald Spengler, a profound philosopher and historian, offer a unique lens through which we can view and understand these dynamics. Spengler's magnum opus, "The Decline of the West," posits a cyclical theory of civilizations, arguing that each civilization has its own distinct inner workings and lifecycle, akin to biological organisms. According to this theory, each civilization goes through equivalent stages in its lifecycle, akin to the life stages of an organism - birth, flourishing, maturity, stagnation and decline. In other words each civilization acts as an independent module. They do, of course, interact with each other, like different organisms interact with each other during their lifetimes, but their life trajectories, like those of each individual organism are self-contained.
Which brings us again to the topic that had perplexed Richard Pipes and other Western historians of Russia. The confusion from comparing imperial Russia to Western colonial empires arises from assuming a linear progression of history for the whole humanity. Understanding however, that Russia finds itself in a phase of its lifecycle, which is not equivalent to the phase of the Western Civilization being compared to will resolve the confusion.
Spengler concentrates mainly on three cultural realms in his comparative analysis of civilizations; (i) Classical Graeco-Roman which he calls Apollonian, (ii) Middle Eastern which he calls Magian and (iii) Western Civilization which he calls Faustian. Separately, he touches upon Russia too, which he correctly believes is a cultural realm distinct from the West, with its distinct inner soul that differs from that of the Faustian Civilization.
Oswald Spengler, in his analysis of historical patterns, equates the Merovingian era in Western Civilization to the period extending from Ivan III's reign to the Time of Troubles in Muscovy/Russia. He perceives these epochs as pre-cultural – i.e., the precursors to the upcoming development of their respective cultural realms, the eras in which the unique world-feelings of the cultures do not yet manifest themselves. Accordingly, the following period of Romanov Dynasty in Russia is equivalent to the Carolingian era in Europe. Therefore, the 20th-21st centuries of Russian history encompassing the Soviet era up to the present day Putin’s Russia represent the post-Carolingian age in Europe that transitioned into the Ottonian era and later the Age of Crusades. The corresponding 10th-12th centuries marked the birth of the Faustian Culture in Europe, a period where the distinctive Faustian world-feeling began to manifest itself, setting the stage for the whole trajectory of the Western Civilization that followed. At the same time, that was the period when the future European nations began to form - the process initiated by the division of the Carolingian realm into East Francia (predecessor of Germany) and West Francia (predecessor of France).
Through this lens, the enigmatic nature of Russia's imperial character from its very inception begins to make sense. It is as if one were puzzled by why European (Faustian) Civilization emerged as an empire, exemplified by the Carolingian Empire. However, this analogy reveals a deeper truth: 'Russian' is not analogous to 'German,' 'French,' or 'English.' Russia is not a nation-state but an entire cultural and civilizational realm - a realm that is in the early, formative stages of its lifecycle, comparable to post-Carolingian/Ottonian Europe. Thus, Russia as a cultural entity is more akin to Europe as a whole rather than to any single European nation. Just as Europe eventually gave birth to distinct nations like Germany, France, and England, so too must the Russian realm undergo its own process of nation-formation. The future might see the emergence of distinct identities within this realm - perhaps Uralians, Siberians, Ingrians, and Novgorodians - each as a unique national unit within the broader Russian civilization. This perspective not only clarifies Russia's historical trajectory but also suggests the potential paths it may follow in the future.
To more accurately trace Russia's historical path to its present state and to forecast its future, we must delve into another key concept in Spengler's philosophy: Pseudomorphosis.
Quite presciently and to the point, Oswald Spengler saw Russia's attachment to Europe initiated by Peter I (in fact, the process began even earlier during the reign of his father, Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich) as artificially imposed and European culture as totally alien to ordinary Russians. He termed such cultural amalgamation where a certain cultural realm is forced to express itself under alien cultural forms imported or imposed from elsewhere as Pseudomorphosis. Oswald Spengler thus predicted a century earlier that Russia will be moving away from the European (Faustian) Civilization and asserting its own unique identity.
One vivid example of historical Pseudomorphosis is the pre-Islamic Middle East, which Spengler called Magian Culture, being dominated by Rome and hence forced to express itself through the forms of Graeco-Roman (Apollonian) Culture, which was entirely alien to it. Only with the advent of Islam did the Magian Culture free itself from Graeco-Roman influence and could express itself organically in line with its own nature.
It is therefore quite likely that Russia is undergoing a process similar to that which the Middle East underwent in the 6th and 7th centuries, when with the rise of Islam, it emphatically asserted its own nature. As a matter of fact, throughout the centuries of Roman rule and domination of the Classical cultural norms the Middle East was seething with apocalyptic hatred towards Rome and everything Roman. In this regard, Islam can be viewed as the consummate form of expression of the deepest longings of the Magian world. At the same time, it was the medium through which the ressentiment towards the Graeco-Roman culture manifested itself. The intensity of that ressentiment was huge due to centuries of cultural suppression under Rome and being forced into the mold of the forms of Apollonian Culture, which were unnatural to the Magian Culture.
This explains the enmity the Islamic (i.e. Magian) world today manifests towards the West, which is represented by Christianity and which they view as the continuation of Rome. The Magian world, in a sense, projects to Christianity and the West its deeply ingrained and centuries-old hatred towards Rome. If Russia is undergoing a similar process it means that the Russian realm will also be imbued with deep apocalyptic hatred towards the West in the same way that the Magian world hated Rome.
Apart from the cases of Magian world being under the shadow of Graeco-Roman (Apollonian) Culture and Russia being under the shadow of Western (Faustian) Culture, another historical example of Pseudomorphosis is the Carolingian era, when the Carolingian kings, most notoriously Charlemagne, imposed Roman-Byzantine architectural traditions, cultural and religious norms on a population which still existed in its pre-cultural phase and to whom those cultural impositions were alien and felt unnatural. And this particular example of historical Pseudomorphosis is indeed more similar to the Russian experience.
Later historians came to refer to that period, spanning the 8th and 9th centuries in Europe, as the “Carolingian Renaissance”. However, such a term, which is used to define that epoch, is in reality a misnomer. Rather than embodying a true cultural awakening it was a fleeting and artificially imposed intellectual flicker, limited only to a handful of educated elite. Instead of representing a new cultural phenomenon, the period was more an attempt to recreate the older Roman-Byzantine culture. This cultural revival did not penetrate deep into Carolingian society and soon after all its effects were gone by the 10th century. In the words of the Benedictine monk Walahfrid Strabo (808 - 849):
This lack of understanding arises from our persistent adherence to a linear view of history and the assumption of a unified humanity progressing along a single path. However, such perspectives are fundamentally flawed. To truly grasp historical processes - particularly when it comes to understanding Russia - we must adopt a cyclical and modular view of history, as articulated by Oswald Spengler. This approach recognizes that different cultural/civilizational realms operate according to their own unique rhythms and internal logics. By embracing this perspective, we can gain deeper insights into Russia's historical trajectory and, crucially, make more accurate predictions about its future.
The current unfolding of world events, particularly Russia's invasion of Ukraine and more generally its stance in the global arena, present a fascinating test case for historical and cultural analysis. In this context, the theories of Oswald Spengler, a profound philosopher and historian, offer a unique lens through which we can view and understand these dynamics. Spengler's magnum opus, "The Decline of the West," posits a cyclical theory of civilizations, arguing that each civilization has its own distinct inner workings and lifecycle, akin to biological organisms. According to this theory, each civilization goes through equivalent stages in its lifecycle, akin to the life stages of an organism - birth, flourishing, maturity, stagnation and decline. In other words each civilization acts as an independent module. They do, of course, interact with each other, like different organisms interact with each other during their lifetimes, but their life trajectories, like those of each individual organism are self-contained.
Which brings us again to the topic that had perplexed Richard Pipes and other Western historians of Russia. The confusion from comparing imperial Russia to Western colonial empires arises from assuming a linear progression of history for the whole humanity. Understanding however, that Russia finds itself in a phase of its lifecycle, which is not equivalent to the phase of the Western Civilization being compared to will resolve the confusion.
Spengler concentrates mainly on three cultural realms in his comparative analysis of civilizations; (i) Classical Graeco-Roman which he calls Apollonian, (ii) Middle Eastern which he calls Magian and (iii) Western Civilization which he calls Faustian. Separately, he touches upon Russia too, which he correctly believes is a cultural realm distinct from the West, with its distinct inner soul that differs from that of the Faustian Civilization.
Oswald Spengler, in his analysis of historical patterns, equates the Merovingian era in Western Civilization to the period extending from Ivan III's reign to the Time of Troubles in Muscovy/Russia. He perceives these epochs as pre-cultural – i.e., the precursors to the upcoming development of their respective cultural realms, the eras in which the unique world-feelings of the cultures do not yet manifest themselves. Accordingly, the following period of Romanov Dynasty in Russia is equivalent to the Carolingian era in Europe. Therefore, the 20th-21st centuries of Russian history encompassing the Soviet era up to the present day Putin’s Russia represent the post-Carolingian age in Europe that transitioned into the Ottonian era and later the Age of Crusades. The corresponding 10th-12th centuries marked the birth of the Faustian Culture in Europe, a period where the distinctive Faustian world-feeling began to manifest itself, setting the stage for the whole trajectory of the Western Civilization that followed. At the same time, that was the period when the future European nations began to form - the process initiated by the division of the Carolingian realm into East Francia (predecessor of Germany) and West Francia (predecessor of France).
Through this lens, the enigmatic nature of Russia's imperial character from its very inception begins to make sense. It is as if one were puzzled by why European (Faustian) Civilization emerged as an empire, exemplified by the Carolingian Empire. However, this analogy reveals a deeper truth: 'Russian' is not analogous to 'German,' 'French,' or 'English.' Russia is not a nation-state but an entire cultural and civilizational realm - a realm that is in the early, formative stages of its lifecycle, comparable to post-Carolingian/Ottonian Europe. Thus, Russia as a cultural entity is more akin to Europe as a whole rather than to any single European nation. Just as Europe eventually gave birth to distinct nations like Germany, France, and England, so too must the Russian realm undergo its own process of nation-formation. The future might see the emergence of distinct identities within this realm - perhaps Uralians, Siberians, Ingrians, and Novgorodians - each as a unique national unit within the broader Russian civilization. This perspective not only clarifies Russia's historical trajectory but also suggests the potential paths it may follow in the future.
To more accurately trace Russia's historical path to its present state and to forecast its future, we must delve into another key concept in Spengler's philosophy: Pseudomorphosis.
Cultural Pseudomorphosis
Quite presciently and to the point, Oswald Spengler saw Russia's attachment to Europe initiated by Peter I (in fact, the process began even earlier during the reign of his father, Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich) as artificially imposed and European culture as totally alien to ordinary Russians. He termed such cultural amalgamation where a certain cultural realm is forced to express itself under alien cultural forms imported or imposed from elsewhere as Pseudomorphosis. Oswald Spengler thus predicted a century earlier that Russia will be moving away from the European (Faustian) Civilization and asserting its own unique identity.
One vivid example of historical Pseudomorphosis is the pre-Islamic Middle East, which Spengler called Magian Culture, being dominated by Rome and hence forced to express itself through the forms of Graeco-Roman (Apollonian) Culture, which was entirely alien to it. Only with the advent of Islam did the Magian Culture free itself from Graeco-Roman influence and could express itself organically in line with its own nature.
It is therefore quite likely that Russia is undergoing a process similar to that which the Middle East underwent in the 6th and 7th centuries, when with the rise of Islam, it emphatically asserted its own nature. As a matter of fact, throughout the centuries of Roman rule and domination of the Classical cultural norms the Middle East was seething with apocalyptic hatred towards Rome and everything Roman. In this regard, Islam can be viewed as the consummate form of expression of the deepest longings of the Magian world. At the same time, it was the medium through which the ressentiment towards the Graeco-Roman culture manifested itself. The intensity of that ressentiment was huge due to centuries of cultural suppression under Rome and being forced into the mold of the forms of Apollonian Culture, which were unnatural to the Magian Culture.
This explains the enmity the Islamic (i.e. Magian) world today manifests towards the West, which is represented by Christianity and which they view as the continuation of Rome. The Magian world, in a sense, projects to Christianity and the West its deeply ingrained and centuries-old hatred towards Rome. If Russia is undergoing a similar process it means that the Russian realm will also be imbued with deep apocalyptic hatred towards the West in the same way that the Magian world hated Rome.
Apart from the cases of Magian world being under the shadow of Graeco-Roman (Apollonian) Culture and Russia being under the shadow of Western (Faustian) Culture, another historical example of Pseudomorphosis is the Carolingian era, when the Carolingian kings, most notoriously Charlemagne, imposed Roman-Byzantine architectural traditions, cultural and religious norms on a population which still existed in its pre-cultural phase and to whom those cultural impositions were alien and felt unnatural. And this particular example of historical Pseudomorphosis is indeed more similar to the Russian experience.
Later historians came to refer to that period, spanning the 8th and 9th centuries in Europe, as the “Carolingian Renaissance”. However, such a term, which is used to define that epoch, is in reality a misnomer. Rather than embodying a true cultural awakening it was a fleeting and artificially imposed intellectual flicker, limited only to a handful of educated elite. Instead of representing a new cultural phenomenon, the period was more an attempt to recreate the older Roman-Byzantine culture. This cultural revival did not penetrate deep into Carolingian society and soon after all its effects were gone by the 10th century. In the words of the Benedictine monk Walahfrid Strabo (808 - 849):
"Charlemagne was able to offer the cultureless and, I might say, almost completely unenlightened territory of the realm which God had entrusted to him, a new enthusiasm for all human knowledge. In its earlier state of barbarousness, his kingdom had been hardly touched at all by any such zeal, but now it opened its eyes to God's illumination. In our own time the thirst for knowledge is disappearing again: the light of wisdom is less and less sought after and is now becoming rare again in most men's minds."
In a related historical parallel, the Petrine period in Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries mirrors this phenomenon. When the term “Russian Culture” is invoked, it often conjures the artistic and intellectual feats of this era. Yet, this celebrated "Russian Culture" bears a striking resemblance to the ephemeral "Carolingian Renaissance”. Like in the latter, the cultural achievements of the former were external impositions completely alien to the indigenous populace. They flourished transiently among European settlers and a small, Europeanized elite in St. Petersburg. And similarly, like the effects of the “Carolingian Renaissance” were neutered by the early 10th century, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia marked the beginning of a rejection of European cultural impositions. Putin’s Russia, in essence, is but a continuation of this cultural ebb, a natural gravitation away from Western (Faustian) cultural influences.
The 10th century in Europe, following the decline of the Carolingians, was a period of cultural interregnum. It was a time when the Byzantine-Roman influences had receded, yet the region had not yet cultivated its own distinctive cultural identity - an identity that would later emerge in the 11th and 12th centuries with the advent of Romanesque architecture that transitioned into Gothic architecture and formation of a new Germanized Christianity - the first true manifestations of the Faustian spirit.
Russia, in its current state, is traversing a similar path. The entity once celebrated as “Russian Culture” is undergoing a process of negation. The country has drifted towards a less cultured state, where the norms of the prison and the thug increasingly overshadow the refined and the elegant, where cultural creativity is almost non-existent and traces of that “Russian Culture” have all but disappeared. In a sense, Russia is returning to its natural self - to the barbarous state of pre-Romanov Muscovy, shedding the last bits of Petrine Pseudomorphosis. The words of Walahfrid Strabo are also perfectly applicable to the present-day Russia: “the thirst for knowledge is disappearing again: the light of wisdom is less and less sought after and is now becoming rare again in most men's minds”.
The comparative analysis of the Carolingian epoch in Europe and the Romanov era in Muscovy/Russia reveals striking parallels, not only in their temporal location at equivalent phases of the lifecycle of their respective cultural realms, but even in the specifics of the events that came to define their rule.
The Carolingian ascent began amidst the fractured landscape of the Frankish Kingdom, torn by civil strife at the cusp of the 7th and 8th centuries. Here, the Carolingians, initially serving as mayors of the palace under the Merovingian kings, began to cement their influence. The position, initially a service role, morphed into a hereditary seat of power under their stewardship, subtly underlining their burgeoning authority. Yet, their dominion was initially restricted to only parts of the Frankish realm. The waning of the Merovingian dynasty presented an opportune moment for the Carolingians. It was during this period of decline that they engaged in a decisive struggle against rival aristocratic families. Their victory was epitomized in the figure of notorious Charles Martel, who, by 718, had established himself as the de facto ruler of the entire kingdom.
Mirroring this historical pattern, the rise of the Romanov Dynasty in Muscovy unfolded under similar circumstances. The turn of the 16th and 17th centuries in Muscovy was a period marred by political crisis that came to be known as the Time of Troubles by later historians, a turbulent epoch following the end of the Rurikid dynasty's longstanding rule. This era was characterized by political instability, power struggles, and a void in leadership. It is here that Boris Godunov, once the mayor of the palace akin to Charles Martel, emerged as a key figure. Before ascending to the throne himself, Godunov played a pivotal role at the court of the last Rurikid tsar - Feodor I. However, unlike his Carolingian counterpart, Godunov's ambition to establish a lasting dynasty was thwarted. The murder of his only son plunged Muscovy into deeper chaos, paving the way for the Romanovs to ascend as the new ruling dynasty amidst the upheaval.
The existential crises that engulfed the Frankish Kingdom and Muscovy during their respective periods of upheaval also bear striking resemblances, each marked by external threats in addition to internal turmoil. In Francia, the encroaching Arabs, having already seized Spain, were inching further northward. This surge was dramatically halted at the Battle of Poitiers in 732 by Charles Martel. This decisive victory not only stemmed the Arab advance but also safeguarded the nascent Faustian Culture of Europe from subjugation by an alien civilization. This moment in history was pivotal, as it averted a potential Pseudomorphosis similar to that which had overtaken the nascent Magian Culture under Roman dominion centuries earlier.
In a parallel historical vein, Muscovy during the Time of Troubles teetered on the brink of conquest by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Such a subjugation would have ensnared Muscovy under the shadow of Faustian Culture, echoing the Roman influence over the Middle East. However, history repeated its act of defiance as the Muscovites, akin to the Franks in 732, repelled the foreign assault, preserving their independence. The Battle of Moscow in 1612 can stand in Muscovy’s annals as the Battle of Poitiers does in Europe’s. Moreover, Dmitry Pozharsky can be regarded as the Russian “Charles Martel”.
Yet, the aftermath of these watershed battles unveils an intriguing historical irony. In both the Frankish and Muscovite realms, the dynasties that ascended in the wake of military triumph - the Carolingians and the Romanovs, respectively - embarked on endeavors that seemingly contradicted their forebears' struggles. Rather than fortifying their unique cultural identities, they initiated the imposition of the very foreign cultural elements their predecessors had militarily resisted. This led to the emergence of cultural Pseudomorphoses within their realms. What sets these instances apart from the Pseudomorphosis in the Magian world is the manner of their inception: while the Magian world was subjugated and transformed through physical conquest, Francia and Muscovy voluntarily embraced these foreign cultural impositions after having successfully repelled foreign invasions.
In the annals of history, the Carolingian era in Francia and the Romanov period in Muscovy/Russia thus emerge as mirror images of one another, particularly in their ambitious projects to infuse foreign cultural norms into their realms.
Both Francia and Muscovy grappled with similar challenges: a widespread lack of literacy among the populace, and more critically, among the clergy. This illiteracy was compounded by the clergy's deficiencies in moral conduct, discipline, and knowledge. Addressing these issues was crucial. Charlemagne, a figurehead of this era in Europe, pioneered the establishment of numerous cathedral and monastery schools. These institutions were not only for future monks and clergy but also for the laity, fostering a culture of education and enlightenment.
Both the Carolingians and the Romanovs launched extensive initiatives to rectify moral conduct, restore ecclesiastical discipline, and restructure the church hierarchy. Moreover, a pivotal issue in both realms was the reliability of religious texts, which had deteriorated over time. Therefore their efforts also encompassed the correction of religious texts and the alignment of rituals with canonical law. In Muscovy, such efforts culminated in the 17th-century religious schism initiated by Patriarch Nikon's reforms. These reforms, aimed at aligning Muscovite rituals and religious texts with those of the Greek Orthodox Church, led to the emergence of the "Old Believers", who adhered to the traditional Muscovite customs and rituals.
Charlemagne and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of the Romanov dynasty shared a profound interest in reforming the church and maintaining unified practices. Charlemagne, upon discovering discrepancies between Frankish and Roman liturgical practices, sought guidance from Pope Hadrian, leading to the adoption of the Dionysio-Hadriana, an authoritative book on canon law which served as the main source for ecclesiastical legislation. Similarly, during the reign of Alexei Mikailovich in Muscovy, Patriarch Nikon engaged extensively with the ecumenical patriarch and Greek clergy in Constantinople, aiming to harmonize Muscovite Orthodox liturgy with its Greek counterpart.
In both realms, foreign missionaries and theologians played instrumental roles. Irish monks in the Frankish Kingdom, akin to Ukrainian theologians under the Romanovs, were the chief educators and reformers. The Irish missionaries were pivotal in establishing Medieval Latin for church and literature and in developing the Carolingian minuscule writing style, which became the standard in medieval Europe and is the direct ancestor of modern-day Latin script. They were instrumental in unifying church practices and correcting religious texts. Similarly, in Muscovy, Ukrainian influence was profound in shaping literary Russian and Church Slavonic, and Ukrainian theologians were key in the reforms that aligned Muscovite Orthodoxy with Greek practices.
It is noteworthy that beyond religious and educational reforms, both Charlemagne and Peter I sought to transform the very fabric of their societies, extending their influence to the private lives and mindsets of their subjects. Peter I's insistence on Western attire and grooming for Russian state officials exemplifies this. Charlemagne's capitularies, the most famous and extensive of which is Admonitio Generalis, is an equivalent example from the Carolingian realm. Through them Charlemagne sought not only legal reform but also what in his mind constituted moral and religious rectitude among his subjects.
What unites Charlemagne and Peter I is the fervor and a sense of higher purpose with which they imposed the reforms, and with them alien cultural norms, on their subjects who were unwilling to accept them. This of course was also accompanied by extreme brutality. Especially the reign of Peter I was defined by widespread persecution and cruel coercion on par with what is usually associated with Stalin’s rule in Russian history. Likewise, Charlemagne’s methods of wresting the old pagan practices out of their subjects and introduce Christianity into his realm were also notable for their cruelty and uncompromising intensity.
One is reminded of the Saxon Wars (772-804) as one of the most notable instances of Charlemagne's forceful spread of Christianity. A particularly brutal episode was the Massacre of Verden, in which Charlemagne ordered the execution of thousands of Saxons. This event was not only a political act of suppression but also a grim message about the consequences of resisting Christianization. Earlier, in his campaign to suppress Saxon paganism, as a symbolic act, Charlemagne had cut down Irminsul, a sacred tree which Saxons revered.
Imposition of Greek liturgical practices and European social norms in Russia during the 17-18th centuries was also accompanied by brutal coercion. One is reminded of the persecution the “Old Believers” faced after they refused to accept Nikonian reforms in 1654. The most outspoken of them were sent to the stake, others to the furthest corners of the Tsardom, often never to return. An episode notable for its brutality was the massacre of the Solovetsky Monastery in 1676 that occurred after seven years of siege in response to the monks’ steadfast refusal to accept the modified liturgical practices and texts. Moreover, out of desperation the “Old Believers” resorted to the most dramatic form of protest imaginable - i.e., self-immolation. The old Muscovite period of Russian history literally ended in flames.
The protest during this period was not merely against religious changes, however, but represented a broader defiance against the imposition of foreign European cultural norms that were deeply alien to Muscovy. The "Old Belief" became the symbol of this defiance, representing a fight to preserve the very essence of Muscovite identity. The struggle against Europeanization - i.e., Pseudomorphosis, found its most dramatic expressions in the social upheavals of the time, such as Stepan Razin's Rebellion (1670-1671) and Pugachev's Rebellion (1773-1775), both brutally crushed by the state. Among those who clung to the old Muscovite ways, there was a growing sense of loss - an awareness that something fundamental to their identity, something intrinsic to their very soul, was being forcibly stripped away. The desperation of this cultural and spiritual struggle is poignantly captured in the words of Archpriest Avvakum, the spiritual leader of the "Old Believers," who pleaded with Patriarch Nikon, his nemesis: "You are Russian! Why do you need these Greek manners?" This cry of anguish encapsulates the deep-rooted tension between preserving a unique cultural identity and the pressures of imposed change, a tension that defined the era of Pseudomorphosis in Muscovite/Russian history.
In essence then, the Carolingian and Romanov periods are historical parallels that unraveled in different centuries and locations, yet at the equivalent stages of the lifecycles of their respective civilizations. Each dynasty, in its quest to uplift and transform its society, embarked on a comprehensive journey of cultural, educational, and religious reform, which subjugated their respective realms to alien cultural forms.
The Muscovite/Russian Pseudomorphosis therefore bears a closer resemblance to the Carolingian experience than to the Middle Eastern one. Unlike the Magian realm, which was compelled to develop under the influence of the alien Apollonian Culture due to physical conquest - first by Alexander the Great and later by Rome - Russia was never subjected to such direct domination by a Western power. Similarly, Carolingian Europe was never physically conquered by Byzantium or the Arab Empire. In the case of the Magian realm, the imposition of alien cultural forms was enforced by a conquering force, making it an externally driven transformation. In contrast, both Muscovy/Russia and Carolingian Europe experienced a form of cultural Pseudomorphosis that, while influenced by external forces, was ultimately an internal decision, shaped by their own historical circumstances and choices.
The end of the Carolingian era in Europe, which was followed by the rise of Ottonians in East Francia and later of Capetians in West Francia, marked the liberation of the Western (Faustian) spirit from alien cultural forms imposed on it earlier. The newly born Faustian Culture began developing its own natural forms of expression. The Romanesque that later transitioned into Gothic architecture and the accompanying emergence of a new Germanized Christianity, which starkly differed from Graeco-Byzantine Christianity, were the first manifestations of this newly liberated Faustian spirit, reflecting a uniquely Western (Faustian) world-feeling.
This liberation from the imposed Greek-Byzantine cultural forms imposed by Carolingians was also symbolized by acts of historical defiance. A striking example is the veneration of the Saxon chieftain Widukind, who fiercely resisted Charlemagne’s brutal Christianization campaign during the Saxon Wars. Although Widukind was ultimately forced to submit to Charlemagne’s rule and accept baptism in 785, marking the formal subjugation of the Saxons, he later became a symbol of Saxon resistance and independence in the post-Carolingian era. Revered as a hero in the Faustian world freed from the stifling influence of the Carolingian-imposed Pseudomorphosis, Widukind's legacy lived on through the Immedinger family, a powerful clan in early medieval Europe that traced its roots back to him. Remarkably, this defiant leader who once stood against Christianization was later canonized by the very institution he had opposed - the Catholic Church. This ironic twist reveals a profound truth: the Christianity that emerged in post-Carolingian Europe was not merely a continuation of the religion imposed by Charlemagne. Instead, it had been transformed and Germanized, reflecting the liberated Faustian spirit and a distinctly Western world-feeling. Widukind’s canonization, therefore, was a symbol of the triumph of a new cultural identity - a Germanized Christianity that honored its heroes according to its own values and worldview, free from the constraints of its earlier Pseudomorphosis.
The distinctiveness of this new Germanized Christianity became increasingly evident in the mounting tensions between the Western Latin rite and the Eastern Byzantine rite during the 9th to 11th centuries, ultimately leading to the Great Schism of 1054. This schism, which formally separated Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, was far more than a mere disagreement over rituals or doctrinal nuances. It marked the culmination of a profound cultural rift - a clash between two fundamentally different world-feelings. The schism represented the revolt of the emerging Faustian spirit against the foreign Greek-Byzantine influence that had previously constrained it. This was not just a religious split but a declaration of cultural independence, as the nascent Western (Faustian) Culture asserted its distinct identity against an imposed heritage that never truly resonated with its nature.
Importantly, the liberation of an emerging culture from the grip of Pseudomorphosis often unleashes a deep-seated hatred and ressentiment toward the dominant culture that once suppressed it. This phenomenon can be observed across various historical contexts. During the Roman rule, the entire Middle Eastern realm, subdued under Roman authority, was suffused with an apocalyptic hatred for Classical Civilization and all that Rome represented. The rise of Islam, with its ethos of Jihad, was the Magian soul’s violent response to this subjugation - a dramatic act of cultural self-liberation from the bonds of Graeco-Roman influence. The enduring animosity that Islam harbors toward Christianity, even today, is rooted in this ancient trauma of Pseudomorphosis. By directing its hatred toward Christianity, Islam sublimates its deeper resentment toward the Graeco-Roman Civilization, which it perceives as embodied in the Christian faith. The rapid spread of Islam across the Roman Middle East - from North Africa and Egypt to the Levant - was fueled, in part, by this deep-seated ressentiment. For instance, the Monophysite Christians of Egypt, later known as Coptic Christians, who harbored a profound resentment toward Roman-Byzantine rule, welcomed the Arab invaders with open arms, eager to throw off the yoke of their former oppressors.
Similarly, the Crusades, which coincided with the Great Schism, can be viewed as an outpouring of the Germanic world's ressentiment toward both Islam and the Byzantine Empire - two forces representing the East (i.e., the Magian world) under whose shadow the Faustian spirit had long been stifled. In fact, in the Germanic Europe of the time, the Byzantine world was despised nearly as intensely as the Muslim world. This animosity was starkly illustrated by the Fourth Crusade, which was directed not against Muslim lands, but against the Byzantine Empire itself, culminating in the brutal sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders. The Crusades can therefore be seen as the Faustian world’s emphatic rejection of the Eastern cultural dominance that had constrained it for centuries, marking a decisive moment in the assertion of Western identity and independence.
Russia, after shedding its European veneer with the Bolshevik Revolution, has entered its own Age of Crusades or Jihad, driven by a profound sense of gloating, revenge, and apocalyptic hatred toward Western (Faustian) Civilization. This Jihad mindset originates from the emphatic liberation of a young culture from the shadow of an older, alien culture - i.e., from the mental suppression of Pseudomorphosis.
In fact, one could argue that Russia declared its Jihad against the West as early as the Bolshevik Revolution, with the declared struggle against "Capitalism" being a symbolic rallying cry for a broader crusade. For the Russians, "Capitalism" was a euphemism for Western Civilization itself. By counterposing "Communism" against "Capitalism," they were, at a deeper level, counterposing Russia against the West. This crusade initially employed covert means, such as supporting and financing revolutionary movements aimed at destabilizing Europe through the Comintern. It is also during the Soviet period that Russia becomes the vanguard of the Third Worldist ressentiment and loathing against Western Civilization, peddling the “anti-colonialist” narrative, which in reality is an explicitly anti-western and anti-white narrative aimed at harming the West.
The Second World War, known in Russia as The Great Patriotic War, can be seen as the first overt Crusade against the "infidel" West, albeit under a different guise. Many in the West are still perplexed by why Russia, which "fought against Nazism" and helped "defeat it," now employs similar, if not worse, tactics in Ukraine. The reality is that Russians view the Second World War through a completely different lens. For Westerners, it was a battle against an internal phenomenon that organically emerged within the Faustian Civilization. For Russians, however, WWII and the "fight against Nazism" represented a broader struggle against the West itself. This is the context in which the cult of victory in The Great Patriotic War must be understood in Russia: it is essentially a religious cult of Crusades, a Jihad against the Faustian West.
Moreover, present-day Russian critiques of Western phenomena - such as liberalism, the LGBT movement, and woke culture under Vladimir Putin - are a continuation of this civilizational conflict. While some Westerners may interpret Russian criticisms as aligning with traditional European values, the reality is that these phenomena are viewed by Russians as emblematic of European culture itself - a culture they regard with deep-seated animosity. This perspective conflates disparate Western phenomena, from Nazism to LGBT rights, into a single category of European-originated ills, reflecting a fundamental difference in interpretation between Russia and the West. For Europeans, these are clearly separate and starkly opposed phenomena, but for Russians, who view them from the outside, they are all manifestations of a singular, alien European culture, which they deeply loathe.
Russians do not despise Western "decadence" out of empathy for the West; they despise these phenomena precisely because they are European. If Europe were traditionalist, they would loathe and criticize European traditions and customs just as they did during the Soviet era. Back then, the main rallying cry against the hated Faustian World was not its decadence, as the West had yet to manifest the phenomena it does today, but rather "Capitalism." In Soviet rhetoric, "Capitalists" was synonymous with "Westerners." Today, they label Westerners as "gays," for example, but the essence remains unchanged.
Putin's era should therefore be seen as the continuation of Russia's "Crusade" or "Jihad" against the West, marked by an apocalyptic hatred against Faustian Civilization, as it frees itself from the last remnants of European Pseudomorphosis. The invasion of Ukraine must be understood in this light, as part of a broader historical process. The Russians’ enmity toward Ukrainians is akin to the hatred of heretics who have abandoned the "Russian World", which, deep inside, for Russians is a euphemism for a distinct Muscovite-Russian Culture that counterposes itself against the Faustian Culture and is involved in a deadly struggle with it. Various Russian political commentators, Russian clerics and the entire Russian Orthodox Church indeed explicitly frame this war as a “Holy War” and a confrontation with the West. Putin himself has called the war against Ukraine, and by extension the Western coalition that supports it, a civilizational struggle against the West.
Russian society today exhibits many characteristics reminiscent of the Crusader spirit that dominated early medieval Europe. In those times, crusaders were granted extraordinary privileges: their lands were protected in their absence, and they received absolution for past crimes and violence, making joining the Crusades an appealing option for many knights and princes. Similarly, in modern Russia, former convicts who join mercenary groups like Wagner, or the Russian army itself, receive preferential treatment. Upon enlisting in the war against Ukraine - framed as a modern-day crusade - they are pardoned for their crimes and, upon returning, are promised advantages such as priority in university admissions or job placements. This preferential treatment mirrors the incentives that once drew European crusaders into battle, underscoring, yet again, the presence of the militant, crusading mindset in Russia's ongoing battle against the West.
This militant mindset is also deeply intertwined with the role of religion in Russian society, particularly the Orthodox Church’s justification of militarism. Many in the West, and even in Ukraine, are shocked by how the Russian Orthodox Church not only endorses the war but also goes so far as to bless soldiers and consecrate nuclear weapons. A striking example is the recently built Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, which is dedicated to the military - a concept utterly alien and appalling to Western and Orthodox Christians alike. Equally perplexing is the veneration of Stalin among devout Russian Orthodox believers. Despite Stalin's brutal persecution of the Church during his reign, where priests were tortured and killed, he is now honored, with some even creating icons of him - one of the greatest persecutors of religion, and Orthodox Christianity in particular.
However, when we step back from a linear view of history and adopt a cyclical and modular perspective, these seeming contradictions begin to make sense. In this phase of its cultural lifecycle, Russia’s approach to religion mirrors that of other nascent cultures during similar stages of their development. Just as the Catholic Church once incited believers to join the Crusades and Islam called its followers to Jihad, the Russian Orthodox Church now plays a similar role in rallying support for Russia’s own "holy war." The veneration of Stalin, too, aligns with this pattern and instead of being contradictory, in fact, makes perfect sense. He is seen not simply as a political leader, but rather as a symbolic figure - a personification of the Russian soul who, through his brutal measures, tore away the vestiges of European Pseudomorphosis. In this light, Stalin’s reverence within the Church echoes the veneration and canonization of Widukind in post-Carolingian/Ottonian Germany, a leader who in his lifetime had fiercely resisted Charlemagne’s Christianization efforts. Deep inside for Russians, Stalin represents a pivotal force in their cultural history, a figure who embodies their defiance against the much hated Faustian Civilization and, more importantly, who realized their deepest desire - i.e., revenge against the West fueled by an apocalyptic hatred against it.
All this suggests that the next stage, and possibly the consummate stage, of Russia’s shedding away its Pseudomorphosis will be the emergence of a uniquely Russian form of Christianity - a Russian "Gothic Christianity" of sorts, one that is organically suited to the Russian soul. While it is difficult to predict the exact contours this new religious expression will take, a close study of the "Old Believers" could provide some clues. Their practices and beliefs, rooted in a pre-Petrine, pre-Westernized Russia, may offer a glimpse into what a truly indigenous Russian Christianity might look like.
This evolution of Russian Christianity will eventually trigger a schism within the broader Eastern Orthodox Christianity, comparable in its historical significance and intensity only to the Great Schism of 1054. And the catalyst to this will likely be the granting of autocephaly to the Ortodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2019 by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. The Russian Orthodox Church's refusal to recognize this autocephaly has already led to tension with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Orthodox Churches in Europe. While Russia may accuse Ukraine of schism, it is, in fact, Russia that will be eventually separating itself from the broader Eastern Orthodox Christianity. As Ukraine moves closer to Europe, reaffirming its connection to the Greek Orthodox tradition, Russia may be on the path to developing a distinct form of Christianity, one that is uniquely Russian and resonates more deeply with its cultural essence.
Russia has long been a source of bewilderment for Western observers, its behavior often confounding those who view it through the lens of a linear historical narrative and the concept of a unified humanity. Much of this confusion arises from our adherence to this flawed perspective. In contrast, Oswald Spengler's cyclical and modular view of history, which posits that civilizations are self-contained entities with their own unique inner workings and equivalent phases of development that are separated temporally and locally, yet are morphologically equivalent (i.e., birth, fluorishing, maturity, stagnation and decline) - much like autonomous organisms - offers a more illuminating framework for understanding Russia, its societal mindset, historical trajectory, and its fraught relationship with the West.
The Western perception of Russia has largely been shaped by the artificially "Europeanized" version of the realm that emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries. However, this European veneer was a superficial imposition on a populace whose cultural roots were fundamentally different. History has shown that such imposed identities are unsustainable, and it was only a matter of time before Russia began to shed this facade and revert to its natural, pre-Romanov self.
This process has been unfolding over the past century. The Bolshevik Revolution marked the beginning of Russia's gradual liberation from European Pseudomorphosis, a process that continues today under Vladimir Putin. In a broader historical context, Putin's Russia is simply advancing the path initiated by the Bolsheviks in 1917, as that cultural realm turns its back on the West and reclaims its unique civilizational identity. This Russian path, distinct and resolute, is inevitably marked by a fierce civilizational confrontation with the West, driven by an intensity comparable to that of Jihad or the Crusades. It is a reality that Western nations must come to terms with in their interactions with Russia.
Oswald Spengler's insights and his cyclical view of history are crucial for us to understand the deep-seated longings and motives of an adversary that has long waged a "holy war" against the West, manifesting in various forms over the past century. By adopting this perspective, we can better grasp the nature of the challenge we face and, ultimately, devise a more effective response to prevail in the deadly confrontation that lies ahead.
Also published at the From Baltic to Black Sea Substack
The 10th century in Europe, following the decline of the Carolingians, was a period of cultural interregnum. It was a time when the Byzantine-Roman influences had receded, yet the region had not yet cultivated its own distinctive cultural identity - an identity that would later emerge in the 11th and 12th centuries with the advent of Romanesque architecture that transitioned into Gothic architecture and formation of a new Germanized Christianity - the first true manifestations of the Faustian spirit.
Russia, in its current state, is traversing a similar path. The entity once celebrated as “Russian Culture” is undergoing a process of negation. The country has drifted towards a less cultured state, where the norms of the prison and the thug increasingly overshadow the refined and the elegant, where cultural creativity is almost non-existent and traces of that “Russian Culture” have all but disappeared. In a sense, Russia is returning to its natural self - to the barbarous state of pre-Romanov Muscovy, shedding the last bits of Petrine Pseudomorphosis. The words of Walahfrid Strabo are also perfectly applicable to the present-day Russia: “the thirst for knowledge is disappearing again: the light of wisdom is less and less sought after and is now becoming rare again in most men's minds”.
Parallels between Carolingian Era in Europe and Romanov Era in Russia
The comparative analysis of the Carolingian epoch in Europe and the Romanov era in Muscovy/Russia reveals striking parallels, not only in their temporal location at equivalent phases of the lifecycle of their respective cultural realms, but even in the specifics of the events that came to define their rule.
The Carolingian ascent began amidst the fractured landscape of the Frankish Kingdom, torn by civil strife at the cusp of the 7th and 8th centuries. Here, the Carolingians, initially serving as mayors of the palace under the Merovingian kings, began to cement their influence. The position, initially a service role, morphed into a hereditary seat of power under their stewardship, subtly underlining their burgeoning authority. Yet, their dominion was initially restricted to only parts of the Frankish realm. The waning of the Merovingian dynasty presented an opportune moment for the Carolingians. It was during this period of decline that they engaged in a decisive struggle against rival aristocratic families. Their victory was epitomized in the figure of notorious Charles Martel, who, by 718, had established himself as the de facto ruler of the entire kingdom.
Mirroring this historical pattern, the rise of the Romanov Dynasty in Muscovy unfolded under similar circumstances. The turn of the 16th and 17th centuries in Muscovy was a period marred by political crisis that came to be known as the Time of Troubles by later historians, a turbulent epoch following the end of the Rurikid dynasty's longstanding rule. This era was characterized by political instability, power struggles, and a void in leadership. It is here that Boris Godunov, once the mayor of the palace akin to Charles Martel, emerged as a key figure. Before ascending to the throne himself, Godunov played a pivotal role at the court of the last Rurikid tsar - Feodor I. However, unlike his Carolingian counterpart, Godunov's ambition to establish a lasting dynasty was thwarted. The murder of his only son plunged Muscovy into deeper chaos, paving the way for the Romanovs to ascend as the new ruling dynasty amidst the upheaval.
The existential crises that engulfed the Frankish Kingdom and Muscovy during their respective periods of upheaval also bear striking resemblances, each marked by external threats in addition to internal turmoil. In Francia, the encroaching Arabs, having already seized Spain, were inching further northward. This surge was dramatically halted at the Battle of Poitiers in 732 by Charles Martel. This decisive victory not only stemmed the Arab advance but also safeguarded the nascent Faustian Culture of Europe from subjugation by an alien civilization. This moment in history was pivotal, as it averted a potential Pseudomorphosis similar to that which had overtaken the nascent Magian Culture under Roman dominion centuries earlier.
In a parallel historical vein, Muscovy during the Time of Troubles teetered on the brink of conquest by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Such a subjugation would have ensnared Muscovy under the shadow of Faustian Culture, echoing the Roman influence over the Middle East. However, history repeated its act of defiance as the Muscovites, akin to the Franks in 732, repelled the foreign assault, preserving their independence. The Battle of Moscow in 1612 can stand in Muscovy’s annals as the Battle of Poitiers does in Europe’s. Moreover, Dmitry Pozharsky can be regarded as the Russian “Charles Martel”.
Yet, the aftermath of these watershed battles unveils an intriguing historical irony. In both the Frankish and Muscovite realms, the dynasties that ascended in the wake of military triumph - the Carolingians and the Romanovs, respectively - embarked on endeavors that seemingly contradicted their forebears' struggles. Rather than fortifying their unique cultural identities, they initiated the imposition of the very foreign cultural elements their predecessors had militarily resisted. This led to the emergence of cultural Pseudomorphoses within their realms. What sets these instances apart from the Pseudomorphosis in the Magian world is the manner of their inception: while the Magian world was subjugated and transformed through physical conquest, Francia and Muscovy voluntarily embraced these foreign cultural impositions after having successfully repelled foreign invasions.
In the annals of history, the Carolingian era in Francia and the Romanov period in Muscovy/Russia thus emerge as mirror images of one another, particularly in their ambitious projects to infuse foreign cultural norms into their realms.
Both Francia and Muscovy grappled with similar challenges: a widespread lack of literacy among the populace, and more critically, among the clergy. This illiteracy was compounded by the clergy's deficiencies in moral conduct, discipline, and knowledge. Addressing these issues was crucial. Charlemagne, a figurehead of this era in Europe, pioneered the establishment of numerous cathedral and monastery schools. These institutions were not only for future monks and clergy but also for the laity, fostering a culture of education and enlightenment.
Both the Carolingians and the Romanovs launched extensive initiatives to rectify moral conduct, restore ecclesiastical discipline, and restructure the church hierarchy. Moreover, a pivotal issue in both realms was the reliability of religious texts, which had deteriorated over time. Therefore their efforts also encompassed the correction of religious texts and the alignment of rituals with canonical law. In Muscovy, such efforts culminated in the 17th-century religious schism initiated by Patriarch Nikon's reforms. These reforms, aimed at aligning Muscovite rituals and religious texts with those of the Greek Orthodox Church, led to the emergence of the "Old Believers", who adhered to the traditional Muscovite customs and rituals.
Charlemagne and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of the Romanov dynasty shared a profound interest in reforming the church and maintaining unified practices. Charlemagne, upon discovering discrepancies between Frankish and Roman liturgical practices, sought guidance from Pope Hadrian, leading to the adoption of the Dionysio-Hadriana, an authoritative book on canon law which served as the main source for ecclesiastical legislation. Similarly, during the reign of Alexei Mikailovich in Muscovy, Patriarch Nikon engaged extensively with the ecumenical patriarch and Greek clergy in Constantinople, aiming to harmonize Muscovite Orthodox liturgy with its Greek counterpart.
In both realms, foreign missionaries and theologians played instrumental roles. Irish monks in the Frankish Kingdom, akin to Ukrainian theologians under the Romanovs, were the chief educators and reformers. The Irish missionaries were pivotal in establishing Medieval Latin for church and literature and in developing the Carolingian minuscule writing style, which became the standard in medieval Europe and is the direct ancestor of modern-day Latin script. They were instrumental in unifying church practices and correcting religious texts. Similarly, in Muscovy, Ukrainian influence was profound in shaping literary Russian and Church Slavonic, and Ukrainian theologians were key in the reforms that aligned Muscovite Orthodoxy with Greek practices.
It is noteworthy that beyond religious and educational reforms, both Charlemagne and Peter I sought to transform the very fabric of their societies, extending their influence to the private lives and mindsets of their subjects. Peter I's insistence on Western attire and grooming for Russian state officials exemplifies this. Charlemagne's capitularies, the most famous and extensive of which is Admonitio Generalis, is an equivalent example from the Carolingian realm. Through them Charlemagne sought not only legal reform but also what in his mind constituted moral and religious rectitude among his subjects.
What unites Charlemagne and Peter I is the fervor and a sense of higher purpose with which they imposed the reforms, and with them alien cultural norms, on their subjects who were unwilling to accept them. This of course was also accompanied by extreme brutality. Especially the reign of Peter I was defined by widespread persecution and cruel coercion on par with what is usually associated with Stalin’s rule in Russian history. Likewise, Charlemagne’s methods of wresting the old pagan practices out of their subjects and introduce Christianity into his realm were also notable for their cruelty and uncompromising intensity.
One is reminded of the Saxon Wars (772-804) as one of the most notable instances of Charlemagne's forceful spread of Christianity. A particularly brutal episode was the Massacre of Verden, in which Charlemagne ordered the execution of thousands of Saxons. This event was not only a political act of suppression but also a grim message about the consequences of resisting Christianization. Earlier, in his campaign to suppress Saxon paganism, as a symbolic act, Charlemagne had cut down Irminsul, a sacred tree which Saxons revered.
Cutting down of Irminsul: Charlemagne forces Chrisitanity upon Saxons
Imposition of Greek liturgical practices and European social norms in Russia during the 17-18th centuries was also accompanied by brutal coercion. One is reminded of the persecution the “Old Believers” faced after they refused to accept Nikonian reforms in 1654. The most outspoken of them were sent to the stake, others to the furthest corners of the Tsardom, often never to return. An episode notable for its brutality was the massacre of the Solovetsky Monastery in 1676 that occurred after seven years of siege in response to the monks’ steadfast refusal to accept the modified liturgical practices and texts. Moreover, out of desperation the “Old Believers” resorted to the most dramatic form of protest imaginable - i.e., self-immolation. The old Muscovite period of Russian history literally ended in flames.
The protest during this period was not merely against religious changes, however, but represented a broader defiance against the imposition of foreign European cultural norms that were deeply alien to Muscovy. The "Old Belief" became the symbol of this defiance, representing a fight to preserve the very essence of Muscovite identity. The struggle against Europeanization - i.e., Pseudomorphosis, found its most dramatic expressions in the social upheavals of the time, such as Stepan Razin's Rebellion (1670-1671) and Pugachev's Rebellion (1773-1775), both brutally crushed by the state. Among those who clung to the old Muscovite ways, there was a growing sense of loss - an awareness that something fundamental to their identity, something intrinsic to their very soul, was being forcibly stripped away. The desperation of this cultural and spiritual struggle is poignantly captured in the words of Archpriest Avvakum, the spiritual leader of the "Old Believers," who pleaded with Patriarch Nikon, his nemesis: "You are Russian! Why do you need these Greek manners?" This cry of anguish encapsulates the deep-rooted tension between preserving a unique cultural identity and the pressures of imposed change, a tension that defined the era of Pseudomorphosis in Muscovite/Russian history.
Patriarch Nikon introducing the Church reforms
In essence then, the Carolingian and Romanov periods are historical parallels that unraveled in different centuries and locations, yet at the equivalent stages of the lifecycles of their respective civilizations. Each dynasty, in its quest to uplift and transform its society, embarked on a comprehensive journey of cultural, educational, and religious reform, which subjugated their respective realms to alien cultural forms.
The Muscovite/Russian Pseudomorphosis therefore bears a closer resemblance to the Carolingian experience than to the Middle Eastern one. Unlike the Magian realm, which was compelled to develop under the influence of the alien Apollonian Culture due to physical conquest - first by Alexander the Great and later by Rome - Russia was never subjected to such direct domination by a Western power. Similarly, Carolingian Europe was never physically conquered by Byzantium or the Arab Empire. In the case of the Magian realm, the imposition of alien cultural forms was enforced by a conquering force, making it an externally driven transformation. In contrast, both Muscovy/Russia and Carolingian Europe experienced a form of cultural Pseudomorphosis that, while influenced by external forces, was ultimately an internal decision, shaped by their own historical circumstances and choices.
Liberation from Pseudomorphosis and the age of ressentiment
The end of the Carolingian era in Europe, which was followed by the rise of Ottonians in East Francia and later of Capetians in West Francia, marked the liberation of the Western (Faustian) spirit from alien cultural forms imposed on it earlier. The newly born Faustian Culture began developing its own natural forms of expression. The Romanesque that later transitioned into Gothic architecture and the accompanying emergence of a new Germanized Christianity, which starkly differed from Graeco-Byzantine Christianity, were the first manifestations of this newly liberated Faustian spirit, reflecting a uniquely Western (Faustian) world-feeling.
This liberation from the imposed Greek-Byzantine cultural forms imposed by Carolingians was also symbolized by acts of historical defiance. A striking example is the veneration of the Saxon chieftain Widukind, who fiercely resisted Charlemagne’s brutal Christianization campaign during the Saxon Wars. Although Widukind was ultimately forced to submit to Charlemagne’s rule and accept baptism in 785, marking the formal subjugation of the Saxons, he later became a symbol of Saxon resistance and independence in the post-Carolingian era. Revered as a hero in the Faustian world freed from the stifling influence of the Carolingian-imposed Pseudomorphosis, Widukind's legacy lived on through the Immedinger family, a powerful clan in early medieval Europe that traced its roots back to him. Remarkably, this defiant leader who once stood against Christianization was later canonized by the very institution he had opposed - the Catholic Church. This ironic twist reveals a profound truth: the Christianity that emerged in post-Carolingian Europe was not merely a continuation of the religion imposed by Charlemagne. Instead, it had been transformed and Germanized, reflecting the liberated Faustian spirit and a distinctly Western world-feeling. Widukind’s canonization, therefore, was a symbol of the triumph of a new cultural identity - a Germanized Christianity that honored its heroes according to its own values and worldview, free from the constraints of its earlier Pseudomorphosis.
The Saxon chieftain Widukind, who resisted Charlemagne
The distinctiveness of this new Germanized Christianity became increasingly evident in the mounting tensions between the Western Latin rite and the Eastern Byzantine rite during the 9th to 11th centuries, ultimately leading to the Great Schism of 1054. This schism, which formally separated Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, was far more than a mere disagreement over rituals or doctrinal nuances. It marked the culmination of a profound cultural rift - a clash between two fundamentally different world-feelings. The schism represented the revolt of the emerging Faustian spirit against the foreign Greek-Byzantine influence that had previously constrained it. This was not just a religious split but a declaration of cultural independence, as the nascent Western (Faustian) Culture asserted its distinct identity against an imposed heritage that never truly resonated with its nature.
Importantly, the liberation of an emerging culture from the grip of Pseudomorphosis often unleashes a deep-seated hatred and ressentiment toward the dominant culture that once suppressed it. This phenomenon can be observed across various historical contexts. During the Roman rule, the entire Middle Eastern realm, subdued under Roman authority, was suffused with an apocalyptic hatred for Classical Civilization and all that Rome represented. The rise of Islam, with its ethos of Jihad, was the Magian soul’s violent response to this subjugation - a dramatic act of cultural self-liberation from the bonds of Graeco-Roman influence. The enduring animosity that Islam harbors toward Christianity, even today, is rooted in this ancient trauma of Pseudomorphosis. By directing its hatred toward Christianity, Islam sublimates its deeper resentment toward the Graeco-Roman Civilization, which it perceives as embodied in the Christian faith. The rapid spread of Islam across the Roman Middle East - from North Africa and Egypt to the Levant - was fueled, in part, by this deep-seated ressentiment. For instance, the Monophysite Christians of Egypt, later known as Coptic Christians, who harbored a profound resentment toward Roman-Byzantine rule, welcomed the Arab invaders with open arms, eager to throw off the yoke of their former oppressors.
Similarly, the Crusades, which coincided with the Great Schism, can be viewed as an outpouring of the Germanic world's ressentiment toward both Islam and the Byzantine Empire - two forces representing the East (i.e., the Magian world) under whose shadow the Faustian spirit had long been stifled. In fact, in the Germanic Europe of the time, the Byzantine world was despised nearly as intensely as the Muslim world. This animosity was starkly illustrated by the Fourth Crusade, which was directed not against Muslim lands, but against the Byzantine Empire itself, culminating in the brutal sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders. The Crusades can therefore be seen as the Faustian world’s emphatic rejection of the Eastern cultural dominance that had constrained it for centuries, marking a decisive moment in the assertion of Western identity and independence.
The Russian Crusade against the Faustian West
Russia, after shedding its European veneer with the Bolshevik Revolution, has entered its own Age of Crusades or Jihad, driven by a profound sense of gloating, revenge, and apocalyptic hatred toward Western (Faustian) Civilization. This Jihad mindset originates from the emphatic liberation of a young culture from the shadow of an older, alien culture - i.e., from the mental suppression of Pseudomorphosis.
In fact, one could argue that Russia declared its Jihad against the West as early as the Bolshevik Revolution, with the declared struggle against "Capitalism" being a symbolic rallying cry for a broader crusade. For the Russians, "Capitalism" was a euphemism for Western Civilization itself. By counterposing "Communism" against "Capitalism," they were, at a deeper level, counterposing Russia against the West. This crusade initially employed covert means, such as supporting and financing revolutionary movements aimed at destabilizing Europe through the Comintern. It is also during the Soviet period that Russia becomes the vanguard of the Third Worldist ressentiment and loathing against Western Civilization, peddling the “anti-colonialist” narrative, which in reality is an explicitly anti-western and anti-white narrative aimed at harming the West.
The Second World War, known in Russia as The Great Patriotic War, can be seen as the first overt Crusade against the "infidel" West, albeit under a different guise. Many in the West are still perplexed by why Russia, which "fought against Nazism" and helped "defeat it," now employs similar, if not worse, tactics in Ukraine. The reality is that Russians view the Second World War through a completely different lens. For Westerners, it was a battle against an internal phenomenon that organically emerged within the Faustian Civilization. For Russians, however, WWII and the "fight against Nazism" represented a broader struggle against the West itself. This is the context in which the cult of victory in The Great Patriotic War must be understood in Russia: it is essentially a religious cult of Crusades, a Jihad against the Faustian West.
Moreover, present-day Russian critiques of Western phenomena - such as liberalism, the LGBT movement, and woke culture under Vladimir Putin - are a continuation of this civilizational conflict. While some Westerners may interpret Russian criticisms as aligning with traditional European values, the reality is that these phenomena are viewed by Russians as emblematic of European culture itself - a culture they regard with deep-seated animosity. This perspective conflates disparate Western phenomena, from Nazism to LGBT rights, into a single category of European-originated ills, reflecting a fundamental difference in interpretation between Russia and the West. For Europeans, these are clearly separate and starkly opposed phenomena, but for Russians, who view them from the outside, they are all manifestations of a singular, alien European culture, which they deeply loathe.
Russians do not despise Western "decadence" out of empathy for the West; they despise these phenomena precisely because they are European. If Europe were traditionalist, they would loathe and criticize European traditions and customs just as they did during the Soviet era. Back then, the main rallying cry against the hated Faustian World was not its decadence, as the West had yet to manifest the phenomena it does today, but rather "Capitalism." In Soviet rhetoric, "Capitalists" was synonymous with "Westerners." Today, they label Westerners as "gays," for example, but the essence remains unchanged.
Putin's era should therefore be seen as the continuation of Russia's "Crusade" or "Jihad" against the West, marked by an apocalyptic hatred against Faustian Civilization, as it frees itself from the last remnants of European Pseudomorphosis. The invasion of Ukraine must be understood in this light, as part of a broader historical process. The Russians’ enmity toward Ukrainians is akin to the hatred of heretics who have abandoned the "Russian World", which, deep inside, for Russians is a euphemism for a distinct Muscovite-Russian Culture that counterposes itself against the Faustian Culture and is involved in a deadly struggle with it. Various Russian political commentators, Russian clerics and the entire Russian Orthodox Church indeed explicitly frame this war as a “Holy War” and a confrontation with the West. Putin himself has called the war against Ukraine, and by extension the Western coalition that supports it, a civilizational struggle against the West.
Russian society today exhibits many characteristics reminiscent of the Crusader spirit that dominated early medieval Europe. In those times, crusaders were granted extraordinary privileges: their lands were protected in their absence, and they received absolution for past crimes and violence, making joining the Crusades an appealing option for many knights and princes. Similarly, in modern Russia, former convicts who join mercenary groups like Wagner, or the Russian army itself, receive preferential treatment. Upon enlisting in the war against Ukraine - framed as a modern-day crusade - they are pardoned for their crimes and, upon returning, are promised advantages such as priority in university admissions or job placements. This preferential treatment mirrors the incentives that once drew European crusaders into battle, underscoring, yet again, the presence of the militant, crusading mindset in Russia's ongoing battle against the West.
This militant mindset is also deeply intertwined with the role of religion in Russian society, particularly the Orthodox Church’s justification of militarism. Many in the West, and even in Ukraine, are shocked by how the Russian Orthodox Church not only endorses the war but also goes so far as to bless soldiers and consecrate nuclear weapons. A striking example is the recently built Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, which is dedicated to the military - a concept utterly alien and appalling to Western and Orthodox Christians alike. Equally perplexing is the veneration of Stalin among devout Russian Orthodox believers. Despite Stalin's brutal persecution of the Church during his reign, where priests were tortured and killed, he is now honored, with some even creating icons of him - one of the greatest persecutors of religion, and Orthodox Christianity in particular.
Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces
However, when we step back from a linear view of history and adopt a cyclical and modular perspective, these seeming contradictions begin to make sense. In this phase of its cultural lifecycle, Russia’s approach to religion mirrors that of other nascent cultures during similar stages of their development. Just as the Catholic Church once incited believers to join the Crusades and Islam called its followers to Jihad, the Russian Orthodox Church now plays a similar role in rallying support for Russia’s own "holy war." The veneration of Stalin, too, aligns with this pattern and instead of being contradictory, in fact, makes perfect sense. He is seen not simply as a political leader, but rather as a symbolic figure - a personification of the Russian soul who, through his brutal measures, tore away the vestiges of European Pseudomorphosis. In this light, Stalin’s reverence within the Church echoes the veneration and canonization of Widukind in post-Carolingian/Ottonian Germany, a leader who in his lifetime had fiercely resisted Charlemagne’s Christianization efforts. Deep inside for Russians, Stalin represents a pivotal force in their cultural history, a figure who embodies their defiance against the much hated Faustian Civilization and, more importantly, who realized their deepest desire - i.e., revenge against the West fueled by an apocalyptic hatred against it.
All this suggests that the next stage, and possibly the consummate stage, of Russia’s shedding away its Pseudomorphosis will be the emergence of a uniquely Russian form of Christianity - a Russian "Gothic Christianity" of sorts, one that is organically suited to the Russian soul. While it is difficult to predict the exact contours this new religious expression will take, a close study of the "Old Believers" could provide some clues. Their practices and beliefs, rooted in a pre-Petrine, pre-Westernized Russia, may offer a glimpse into what a truly indigenous Russian Christianity might look like.
This evolution of Russian Christianity will eventually trigger a schism within the broader Eastern Orthodox Christianity, comparable in its historical significance and intensity only to the Great Schism of 1054. And the catalyst to this will likely be the granting of autocephaly to the Ortodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2019 by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. The Russian Orthodox Church's refusal to recognize this autocephaly has already led to tension with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Orthodox Churches in Europe. While Russia may accuse Ukraine of schism, it is, in fact, Russia that will be eventually separating itself from the broader Eastern Orthodox Christianity. As Ukraine moves closer to Europe, reaffirming its connection to the Greek Orthodox tradition, Russia may be on the path to developing a distinct form of Christianity, one that is uniquely Russian and resonates more deeply with its cultural essence.
Conclusion
Russia has long been a source of bewilderment for Western observers, its behavior often confounding those who view it through the lens of a linear historical narrative and the concept of a unified humanity. Much of this confusion arises from our adherence to this flawed perspective. In contrast, Oswald Spengler's cyclical and modular view of history, which posits that civilizations are self-contained entities with their own unique inner workings and equivalent phases of development that are separated temporally and locally, yet are morphologically equivalent (i.e., birth, fluorishing, maturity, stagnation and decline) - much like autonomous organisms - offers a more illuminating framework for understanding Russia, its societal mindset, historical trajectory, and its fraught relationship with the West.
The Western perception of Russia has largely been shaped by the artificially "Europeanized" version of the realm that emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries. However, this European veneer was a superficial imposition on a populace whose cultural roots were fundamentally different. History has shown that such imposed identities are unsustainable, and it was only a matter of time before Russia began to shed this facade and revert to its natural, pre-Romanov self.
This process has been unfolding over the past century. The Bolshevik Revolution marked the beginning of Russia's gradual liberation from European Pseudomorphosis, a process that continues today under Vladimir Putin. In a broader historical context, Putin's Russia is simply advancing the path initiated by the Bolsheviks in 1917, as that cultural realm turns its back on the West and reclaims its unique civilizational identity. This Russian path, distinct and resolute, is inevitably marked by a fierce civilizational confrontation with the West, driven by an intensity comparable to that of Jihad or the Crusades. It is a reality that Western nations must come to terms with in their interactions with Russia.
Oswald Spengler's insights and his cyclical view of history are crucial for us to understand the deep-seated longings and motives of an adversary that has long waged a "holy war" against the West, manifesting in various forms over the past century. By adopting this perspective, we can better grasp the nature of the challenge we face and, ultimately, devise a more effective response to prevail in the deadly confrontation that lies ahead.
Also published at the From Baltic to Black Sea Substack
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