WHY IS CHINA SUDDENLY SO KEEN ON SUPPORTING PUTIN?

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In China political legitimacy comes from aligning with the archetype of the devious leader

by Daniel Barge

No matter how clever they are, American leaders earn their political legitimacy by schlubbing it with the proles, i.e. sitting down and having a beer or a burger with Joe the Plumber.

We have just witnessed scenes of this in Ohio, where Donald Trump has been trying to reboot his appeal by visiting a MacDonalds near the scene of a recent rail crash and toxic leak. 

America: the schlub to power

In China, however, things are different: No matter how stupid they are, China's leaders have to sell themselves on their ability to, at least, seem Machiavellian geniuses. 

The foundation document of Chinese power politics is Sun Tzu's The Art of War, which is mainly a manual on using dirty tricks to win power. Every Chinese leader's legitimacy ultimately rests on being seen as the trickiest and most devious bastard in the cunt-house, and right now Xi Jingping is seen as the biggest steaming turd of underhanded chicanery there is. Yes, the guy has an image to worry about!

This same archetype also gave us the fictional character of Fu-Manchu, essentially the original Bond villain, and that is exactly the vibe Xi is going for.

So how does this play into the Ukrainian War and the news that China, after one year of sitting on the side-lines, is about to supply Russia with armaments.

When the war broke out last February, Xi could have done any number of things. The most obvious ones were:

(1) Openly and honestly stand by his ally, Putin, and take on the West side-by-side
(2) Stand back, do nothing, try to keep China out of the mess and protect China's economic interests

But the truth is that he didn't really have any choices like these. In order to be seen as the "Great Leader," Xi had to take the course that would make him seem like one helluva cunning sneaky bastard.

For the first year of the war, he largely followed the Number 2 path, and kept China out of involvement. This was important to do as there were a lot of imponderables and the smart leader should see which way the wind is blowing before moving his chess pieces. But that kind of sit-back-and-wait approach is not going to cut it with the Chinese political class forever. They need their leaders to go "full Fu-Manchu" at some point. Number 2 just looks too safe and cosy, and sends out a signal of political weakness. Of course, Number 1 is no good either. It just looks a bit brash and stupid, and also sends out a signal of political weakness.

Both of these are clear obvious choices, with clear, obvious drawbacks. But if "Sun Tzu culture" teaches anything, it is to avoid doing the obvious. It also teaches that every crisis -- especially someone else's crisis -- is an opportunity not to be missed.

So, based on this appreciation, what is Xi's deep game here?

Obviously, it's one in which China does the "unexpected" and emerges stronger than before.

There are two paths to that. The first and most obvious one is one in which Putin pulls off a win, while the less obvious path is that Putin is defeated and Russia weakened. But there are many shades of possibility within both of these.

As for the first path -- one involving a Putin "win" -- it could be claimed that Russia has already lost. Even if it secures a few bits of territory and stops Ukraine immediately joining NATO, the cost will have been too heavy. The Russian army is already a shadow of its former self, the Russian economy too. The goodwill the Russian people had for their leaders has been tapped to breaking point, while international resistance to Russia is now at toxic levels. Any victory that Putin can grind out of this mess would, at best, be the most Pyrrhic of Pyrrhic victories.

Russia losing, however, may be a lot more interesting to "Fu Man Pooh."

Of course, Putin could realise how fruitless and pointless this war has become for Russia and immediately decide to end it. That would be the optimum course for Putin and all the shills who support him: get the fuck out of the Ukraine and patch up some kind of peace or ceasefire.

But that would not necessarily suit Xi.

Russia would still have enough strength to maintain some of its Great Power status, its unity and territorial integrity. But what if Russia kept its disastrous war with the Ukraine (and the West) going for another year or two? 

In that case, the Kremlin would have to hollow out its economy even more, drain its strength, and expend the last remnants of its popular legitimacy among the Russian people. It would probably then reach breaking point.

If it then lost the war, it wouldn't just lose on points and still have strength for future bouts, it would be a knock-out blow that would quite possibly leave it in a geopolitical wheelchair. And who would be there to pick up the pieces? Maybe the West, with a new compliant democratic government in Moscow, or else, with the country falling apart, we might instead see the shadow of Chinese Imperialism lengthening over Siberia, which is where most of the non-human assets of Russia lie anyway.

Viewed in this way, China's decision to finally start supplying a battered and desperate Russia with weapons one year into the war makes perfect Machiavellian sense. This should be a wake-up call for Putin to realise what's really going on.

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Mongol-Lag and the Anti-Russianness of the Putinist State